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This is a response to some of the issues raised by Scerri, 
“Some comments on the views of Niaz, Rodríguez and Brito 
(2004) on Mendeleev’s periodic system”. We thank the Edi-
tor, Dr. Andoni Garritz, for inviting us to write this response. 
However, due to limited space in the journal I shall restrict 
myself to responding to only the important issues. In order 
to help the reader I have maintained the same section head-
ings as those of Scerri.
According to Scerri, “They [Niaz et al.] claim that most his-
torians take a naïve inductivist approach to the development 
of the periodic table and that they consider that Mendeleev 
proceeded on the basis of empirical observations rather 
than the atomic theory” (p. 3, italics added). Once again, 
Scerri writes: “It would appear that Niaz et al. believe that if 
they can show that Mendeleev indeed possessed the ability 
to ‘speculate’ then they can oppose the vast majority of his-
torians of science who apparently wrongly hold that Mende-
leev was not a speculator but merely followed the observa-
tional evidence like a good naïve inductivist” (p. 4, italics 
added). Actually, nowhere in the manuscript do we refer to 
present day historians or Mendeleev as naïve inductivists. 
On the contrary, we referred to their approach as an induc-
tive generalization. A student of philosophy of science 
knows well that the two are different things. Furthermore, 
nowhere in our article do we refer to the approach followed 
by the historians as wrong. We simply tried to present an al-
ternative interpretation of Mendeleev’s contribution, which 
was accepted as such by the reviewers of Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science.
In response to our step 4 (Niaz et al., p. 274), Scerri noted: 
“Needless to say, this passage does not provide very com-
pelling ammunition for Niaz et al. for at least a couple of 
reasons. Firstly it is a statement made by Mendeleev a full 
20 years after the discovery of chemical periodicity. Second-
ly it is a statement made to a general audience at an award 
lecture by a scientist looking back at his achievements. Such 
statements are notoriously prone to grandiose generaliza-
tions . . .” (p. 6, italics added). Now, let us consider the follow-
ing information:
 a) According to Kaji (2003), as early as 1864, in a lecture 
on theoretical chemistry Mendeleev stated: “In fact, 
while the atomic theory was strongly supported by the 
law of deﬁnite chemical compounds, it was also chal-
lenged by the so-called indeﬁnite compounds” (p. 194). 
This shows Mendeleev’s ambivalence (which we stressed 
throughout our article) and also the acknowledgment 
of the relationship between the atomic theory and the 
law of deﬁnite proportions. Interestingly, these views 
were expressed by Mendeleev a full 25 years before the 
Faraday Lecture;
 b) Van Spronsen (1969) considers Mendeleev’s Faraday 
Lecture of 1889 as “highly inﬂuential” (p. 348). Further-
more, a review of the literature shows that most schol-
ars cite Mendeleev’s Faraday Lecture.
Readers will note that we have presented counter evidence 
with respect to the two arguments put forward by Scerri and 
hence our line of reasoning in Step 4 has been upheld.
In response to our Step 5 (Niaz et al., 2004, pp. 274-275), 
Scerri stated: “Contrary to what the authors conclude in the 
ﬁnal line quoted above, this statement is not an acknowl-
edgment of any role played by atomic theory . . . Mendeleev 
consistently argued against the unity of matter and against 
Prout’s hypothesis to that effect” (p. 8). If we read once again 
Mendeleev’s quote in Step 5, it will reveal that it was not the 
question of Prout’s hypothesis (which Mendeleev denied 
and we noted in our article, p. 275), but rather Dalton’s law of 
multiple proportions, which was at stake. Actually, Mende-
leev (1889) himself explains the data presented with respect 
to the oxides in Step 5, in the following categorical terms: 
“The periodic law has clearly shown that the masses of the 
atoms increase abruptly, by steps, which are clearly con-
nected in some way with Dalton’s law of multiple propor-
tions . . .” (p. 642). It is interesting to note that we cited this 
explanation by Mendeleev in Niaz et al (2004, p. 275) and for 
some reason Scerri decided to ignore it! Similarly, Weisberg 
(2007) has endorsed a similar thesis: “Mendeleev showed 
that the quantity of oxygen in the oxides was a periodic 
function of the element’s group (column) on the Periodic 
Table . . . This can be accounted for by the Periodic Law, but 
would have remained mysterious otherwise” (pp. 214-215). 
Furthermore, Dalton’s law of multiple proportions is con-
sidered as evidence to corroborate the atomic theory by the 
dean of modern chemistry: “The discovery of the law of 
multiple proportions was the ﬁrst great success of Dalton’s 
atomic theory. This law was not induced from experimental 
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results, but was derived from the theory, and then tested by 
experiments” (Pauling, 1964, p. 26). The similarity between 
the explanation provided by Mendeleev in 1864, 1889 and its 
endorsement by Pauling in 1964 is striking indeed!
Mendeleev as a positivist
According to Scerri: “Whereas the authors [Niaz et al., 2004] 
imply that Mendeleev’s public statements were made for 
‘political reasons’ and that he was falsely trying to pass himself 
off as a positivist such an interpretation seems a little far-
fetched” (p. 9, italics added). This is a gross misrepresenta-
tion of our views, as nowhere did we use such expressions, 
either implicitly or explicitly. On the contrary, we argued 
that Mendeleev was rather ambiguous/ambivalent with re-
spect to the atomic theory and its role in the periodic table.
Prediction, novel and otherwise
According to Scerri: “. . . Lakatos wrote a footnote to say that 
post-diction should be regarded as a variety of ‘prediction’ 
the authors seem not to grasp the full worth of this conces-
sion” (p. 10). This is surprising indeed! It was Lakatos who 
included a footnote and hence Scerri’s quarrel is not with us.
With respect to novel predictions Scerri states: “In addi-
tion many articles have sought to explore this issue more 
deeply in the context of the periodic table. Although Niaz 
et al. cite some of these papers they seem to miss the central 
point since they immediately return to discussing Lakatos 
and his view of prediction in the narrower sense of novel 
prediction” (p. 10). Readers would certainly have liked to see 
some references that treat ‘this issue more deeply’. Howev-
er, Scerri provides not a single example.
According to Scerri: “The article by Scerri and Worrall ar-
gues that Brush should not draw back from even applying 
his view to the acceptance of the periodic table” (p. 11). Actu-
ally, Brush (2007) has not drawn back and stated clearly: 
“Having found little evidence for predictivism in physics, I 
did ﬁnd it in chemistry, in particular in the case of Mende-
leev’s periodic law” (p. 257). So what is the argument!
Once again, Scerri asks a rhetorical question: “Why 
should the only alternative to the inductive piling up of 
knowledge be just the use of theory?” (p. 12). Readers would 
have liked to know some alternatives and Scerri provides 
none.
According to Scerri: “Are we to understand that Niaz et al. 
are here even wanting to equate the notion of a hypothesis 
with that of a scientiﬁc theory?” (p. 13). The relationship be-
tween hypotheses, predictions and theories is important in 
both science education and the philosophy of science. Ac-
cording to Lawson (2010): “Persons at Level 1 view science 
as an inductive and descriptive enterprise. Persons at Level 2 
view science in terms of hypothesis generation and test. 
Persons at Level 3 see science as theory driven. That is, the-
ories are generated and their postulates are tested via 
planned tests with predicted consequences and theories are 
used to generate speciﬁc hypotheses, which are in turn tested 
in a similar manner” (p. 257, italics added). Interestingly, 
Lawson considers our interpretation of Mendeleev’s contri-
bution as an example of Level 3 epistemology. According to 
Brush (2007): “It should be recognized that physicists (and 
some other scientists) use the word ‘prediction’ to mean ‘de-
duction’ (of an empirical fact from a hypothesis or theory) 
regardless of novelty” (p. 257, n. 1). This clearly shows that 
hypotheses, predictions and theories are intricately related. 
Consequently, Wartofsky’s (1968) assertion that Mendeleev, 
“. . . was using the periodic table as a hypothesis from which 
predictions could be deduced” (p. 203), necessarily refers to 
a theoretical framework. On page 13, Scerri reproduced this 
quote, but without the necessary quotation signs, thus 
seeming to attribute this statement to Niaz et al (2004). We 
consider this to be a misrepresentation. In this context, it is 
important to note that Scerri in an endnote (n. 8) states, “. . . 
arguments by Niaz et al. for claiming that Mendeleev was 
acting as a theorist consist of one single quotation from the 
physicist Ziman who was perhaps not being too reﬂective . . .” 
(p. 17, italics added). A novice student of philosophy of sci-
ence may wonder if this is how philosophers reason when 
the evidence goes against them.
In another endnote (n. 6), Scerri states: “The only histo-
rian or philosopher of science to my knowledge that has ar-
gued for a ‘theoretical’ reading of Mendeleev’s discovery is 
Michael Weisberg, whose article I have criticized in a recent 
publication (Scerri, 2012). This makes interesting reading as 
Scerri’s criticism of Weisberg was published in a journal 
whose Editor is Scerri. Once again a novice student would 
like to know if Weisberg was invited to respond. Further-
more, readers would like to know what exactly Weisberg 
(2007) asserted: “. . . Mendeleev had no empirical knowledge 
that there were any empty slots to be ﬁlled . . . He ﬁrst needed 
to hypothesize the existence of the missing elements by an-
alyzing the theoretical structure he had created. Then he was 
able to use the trends posited by the Periodic Table to make 
predictions about the properties of the ‘missing’ elements. 
This prediction was a theoretical, not merely classiﬁcatory, 
achievement” (p. 214, italics added). Now as Scerri claims 
that he criticized Weisberg’s thesis, let us see what exactly 
was rebutted: “Unfortunately, Weisberg says nothing to sup-
port his claim that Mendeleev examined ‘the theoretical 
structure that he had created’. This claim need to be moti-
vated by some reference to Mendeleev’s own writings, al-
though I do not think this will be possible from my knowl-
edge of the Russian chemist’s writings” (Scerri, 2012, p. 277). 
Indeed, it would be interesting to see what Scerri found in 
the ‘Russian chemist’s writings’. For the time being we have 
Weisberg’s (2007) elaboration of Menedeleev’s theoretical 
structure, that was ignored by Scerri: “When the elements 
were properly ordered, Mendeleev argued, one could see 
the periodic dependence of elemental properties on their 
atomic weight. This principle, which Mendeleev called The 
Periodic Law, is one of the bedrock principles which orga-
nizes chemistry” (p. 213).
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Niaz et al. on laws of science
According to Scerri: “If as Cartwright suggests all scientiﬁc 
laws strictly lie, then of course Mendeleev’s law too cannot 
be considered as a strictly valid law of science” (p. 15). A stu-
dent of philosophy of science knows well the context in 
which Cartwright suggested that scientiﬁc laws ‘lie’, namely 
the inclusion of ceteris paribus modiﬁers can make the laws 
to be better approximations. In our view, if laws are at best 
approximations, so are theories and hence Mendeleev’s the-
oretical framework needs improvement. This idea has been 
explained by Weisberg (2007) in cogent terms: “While it is 
true that Mendeleev’s periodic system is in need of further 
theoretical explanation, the same could be said of any theo-
ry that is not a fundamental physical one” (p. 215). 
Conclusion
Scerri has gone to considerable length (5845 words) to cri-
tique our views about Mendeleev’s periodic table. Neverthe-
less, we have demonstrated (despite limitations of space) 
that none of his criticisms can be considered as valid, 
and that at times he simply misrepresents or ignores our 
position. Interestingly, we have shown that at least three 
philosophers of science (Wartofsky, Weisberg and Ziman) 
endorse the view that Mendeleev’s periodic table can be 
sustained by a theoretical framework.
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